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Ruslan Nimchynskyi: "The world today must support Ukraine’s victory plan".
13 November 2024 11:39

By Ruslan Nimchynskyi, Ambassador of Ukraine to the Republic of Cyprus 

The involvement of North Korean troops by Russia in the war against Ukraine is yet another demonstration of Moscow’s willingness to escalate to achieve its goals of destroying Ukraine and the international order based on international law and the UN Charter.

The deployment of North Korean troops in the theater of military operations is a dangerous escalation of the conflict. It is a direct response from the Russian Federation to the proposals of potential territorial concessions by Ukraine in exchange for peace and the indecisiveness of partners regarding a radical increase in support for Ukraine.

If there is no sufficiently harsh response to the presence of North Korean troops, it cannot be ruled out that other allies of Russia will also become more actively involved in the aggressive war against Ukraine, potentially destabilizing the situation in the Indo-Pacific region.

The engagement of North Korean troops creates new realities, clearly demonstrating that the West’s tactic of self-restraint by its red lines has proved ineffective and must be changed.

The direction of these changes is clearly outlined in the President of Ukraine’s Victory Plan: this includes Ukraine’s membership in NATO, irreversible strengthening of Ukraine’s defense, and a deterrence package on Ukraine’s territory capable of forcing the aggressor to cease hostilities and establish a just peace.

Moscow understands only the language of force and has once again shown that it perceives everything else as weakness and encouragement for further aggression. Capitulation and a policy of appeasement cannot stop Russia.

Any discussion of ideas of territorial concessions only encourages the Russian Federation to continue active attacks aiming to seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible in anticipation of a truce.

Territorial concessions to the aggressor will not only fail to stop the conflict but will also become a catalyst for further destabilization, giving Russia time to regain strength and prepare for a new offensive.

Numerous ceasefires and over 200 rounds of consultations in the Minsk and Normandy formats in 2014 – 2022 did not stop Russia from preparing for a full-scale invasion. Such proposals now do not bring peace closer—instead, they make the continuation of Russian aggression inevitable.

The situation after 2014 shows that the occupier’s control over temporarily occupied territories can last for decades, which, combined with Russia’s genocidal policies in these areas, poses a threat to the complete destruction of Ukrainian identity and impunity for committed war crimes.

Lifting sanctions without defeating Russia and punishing it for its act of aggression would cement Putin’s victory and provide him with resources for the next wave of aggression.

The so-called compromise ceasefire with Russia is strategically dangerous on a global scale. It creates a precedent that will be interpreted as a successful achievement of the aggressor’s goals through force. This will only encourage further expansion by the bloc of revisionist states and exacerbate security situations in various regions of the world.

There is no such “definition of victory” that would reward the aggressor with control over occupied territories or in any other way. Such a scenario would represent a defeat for Ukraine and its allies, signalling to all those who hesitate between paths of development that democracy is weaker than autocracy and cannot defend itself.

Ukraine is a symbol of the strategic resilience of the West – losing this symbol would put other pillars of Western deterrence in question. Agreeing to Russia’s territorial gains would be a capitulation of the West to the demands of Russia and its allies, sharply reducing the number of states that would orient themselves toward the Western model of development and the supremacy of international law as a key principle in international relations. This, in turn, would encourage revisionism worldwide.

Pacifying Russia at the expense of Ukraine would destroy the last chances for the democratization of the Russian regime in the future, and thus the chances for normalizing relations even in the distant perspective. Over the years of war, an authoritarian anti-Western course has been maximally consolidated in that country. Victory in the war could cement the revisionist criminal regime in Russia and destroy all chances for the development of pro-democratic alternatives for a long time.

A ceasefire or the end of the war on the terms of Moscow and its allies – meaning the preservation of its control over the temporarily occupied territories – would inevitably lead to the collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russia’s example would demonstrate that the mere possession of nuclear weapons allows a country to achieve goals incompatible with international law by using force. In contrast, the victim of aggression in the event of an attack by a nuclear state would be restricted in its rights to defence under the pretext of a desire to avoid escalation.

A defeat of Ukraine would lead to a rift within the EU and NATO, strengthening Eurosceptic and pro-Russian political forces within the member countries, as well as legitimizing the destructive policies of such parties that have already gained or could gain power in these countries, undermining the unity and strengthening of the EU and NATO.

The Kremlin employs a strategy of maximum pressure on Ukraine and the West, attempting to demonstrate that Russia possesses strategic initiative and escalation dominance. However, this is not true, as the Russian strategy remains fragile and presents a façade of strength.

Today, Russia is significantly weaker than the West, and the Ramstein countries have far greater resources to quickly ensure Ukraine’s victory and end the war. Therefore, there are substantial opportunities to strengthen solidarity with Ukraine.

Ukraine is capable of defeating Russia on the battlefield with adequate Western support. Ukraine does not need a breather; it requires greater solidarity, more weapons, and the lifting of restrictions on their use.

Action is needed here and now. If this is not done, considering the dynamics of Russia’s rearmament, the building of its alliances, and the transition of its economy to a war footing, the conflict is likely to be renewed in a few years and geographically expanded—yet in a deteriorated security configuration. Consequently, the cost of deterrence and defense will increase significantly.

To avoid a Third World War tomorrow, Russia must be deterred today. An effective tool for this is the implementation of the President of Ukraine’s Victory Plan.

It is necessary to translate the existing advantage of Western partners in resources and capabilities over Russia into a practical battlefield advantage through the expansion of defensive support, as well as through the mobilization of the military-industrial complex of European countries and investments in Ukraine’s defense industry.

NATO membership is the only effective security guarantee to end Russian aggression and prevent its recurrence in the future by eliminating geopolitical uncertainty and removing “grey security zones” that provoke revisionist policies.

An invitation to NATO membership today, along with bilateral security agreements until accession, alongside the implementation of other points of the Victory Plan, will change the dynamics on the battlefield and compel Russia to a comprehensive, just, and sustainable peace.

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